Compromising Radiated Emission from a Power Line Communication Cable

Virginie Degardin, Pierre Laly, Martine Lienard, Pierre Degauque


This contribution presents a preliminary investigation on the possibility of eavesdropping, i.e., of extracting information by exploiting the electromagnetic field radiated in the vicinity of a power line communication (PLC) network. This kind of problem is usually known in the electromagnetic compatibility area under the codename TEMPEST. Electromagnetic field measurements were carried out in a laboratory environment, both inside and outside a building, and the main statistical characteristics of the compromising channel are presented. A software tool simulating a PLC communication has been developed and used to draw apreliminary conclusion on whether the radiated emissions can be exploited or not.


Power line communication, TEMPEST, Transmission line, Interference

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